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February/March 2002 
In a televised speech on January 12, 2002, Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf announced that 
religious extremist organizations based in Pakistan would no longer be allowed to operate with impunity 
or continue fanning hatred and communal violence. In his address, which was aimed at the people of 
Pakistan, the Indian government, and the international community, Musharraf declared that he will not 
allow Pakistan's territory to be used for terrorist activities and that no Pakistan-based organization will be 
allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of religion. [1] Emphasizing that "Pakistanis are sick of 
sectarian violence," Musharraf said his goal is to make Pakistan a progressive, modern, and dynamic 
state. Addressing Indian concerns about cross-border violence, Musharraf further announced the banning 
of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), two terrorist organizations named by India as 
involved in the bloody December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi. Musharraf said 
that while Pakistan would continue its moral and political support to the Kashmir movement, no individual 
or organization would be allowed to indulge in terrorism in the name of Kashmir. He urged Indian Prime 
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to return to the negotiating table in order for both sides to resolve the 
Kashmir dispute in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir, and to progress toward 
normalization of India-Pakistan ties. 
General Musharraf's speech has received widespread acclaim from the international community. The 
Indian government also welcomed the speech, while emphasizing the expectation that Musharraf's words 
will be translated into action. In this article, we assess the significance of General Musharraf's speech 
from different perspectives, and its potential impact on the region's peace and security. 
By joining the international coalition against global terrorism in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks in the United States, General Musharraf had demonstrated a desire to distance himself 
from religious extremism. This effort constituted a major shift in Pakistan's policy of supporting regional 
Jihad (holy war). Musharraf, however, reiterated that supporting the U.S.-led coalition's military operations 
in Afghanistan does not imply disavowing Jihad in Kashmir, which he described as a legitimate struggle of 
the Kashmiri population against Indian rule. [2] Some Pakistan-based terrorist organizations apparently 
took Musharraf's ambiguity on Jihad in Kashmir to be his acquiescence to continued Islamist violence 
against India, which manifested most recently in the December 13 attack on the Indian Parliament. [3] 
India reacted to this attack by mobilizing its army along the India-Pakistan border; Pakistan followed suit, 
thereby leading to the present military stand-off and threat of nuclear conflagration in South Asia. [4] 
Musharraf's recent assurance that no individual or organization will be allowed to indulge in acts of 
terrorism in the name of Kashmir is ipso facto renunciation of Jihad as a state policy, which is significant 
from a regional perspective. If his intent is sincere and he proves able to redeem his pledge by translating 
words into action, it is likely that the region will move towards a long-term and lasting peace. 
Inside Pakistan, Musharraf's speech drew mixed reactions. Although criticism from the main political 
parties was restrained, religious parties and Jihadi outfits rejected the speech outright. The Pakistan 
People's Party (PPP) criticized Musharraf for failing to acknowledge that his government, by ignoring 
earlier warnings about these Jihadi outfits, had pursued policies that damaged Pakistan's international 
standing. [5] The Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD) condemned the "rules of behavior" for 
religious parties spelled out in the speech, according to which the Madaris (Islamic religious schools) and 
mosques would be required to register with the government, and their numbers would be limited. ARD 
President Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan pointed out on January 12, 2002 that even the British colonialists 
did not introduce such draconian laws to curb the religious activities of the people. Jihadi organizations 
and other Islamic parties banned by President Musharraf pledged to continue their struggle (Jihad) under 
different names; some of them even threatened to take legal recourse and initiate mass protests against 
Musharraf's government. The LeT and Al-Badar organizations argued that the liberation of Kashmir is 
critical to the national unity of Pakistan, and that any measure undermining the struggle is against 
Pakistan's national interests. [6] 
India welcomed General Musharraf's declaration that Pakistan-based support for terrorist activities 
against India (including Kashmir) will be stopped. [7] Indian Home (Interior) Minister L.K. Advani, in an 
interview in New York on January 12, 2002 said the Indian government will judge the Pakistani 
government's intentions by actions and not by words. [8] During a visit to Washington on January 17, 
Indian Defense Minister George Fernandez warned that India will increase its pressure on Pakistan's 
government until Musharraf ends cross-border terrorism in Kashmir, and hands over 20 individuals 
named as terrorists by India.  
From a western perspective, Musharraf's landmark speech positioned him as the kind of leader in the 
Muslim world the West has been desperately seeking. Some western analysts note that by verbally taking 
on political Islam, Musharraf has helped define how Islam and its institutions should fit with the 
requirement of a modern society. [9] On January 13, an article in the New York Times noted that many in 
the United States see the general's effort to turn away from extremism and religious intolerance - and to 
build a stable, modern nation - as being in India's long-term interests. Quoting a western diplomat, the 
article also said, "Is the General a man genuinely attempting to end India-Pakistan conflict? Or is it the 
speech of a man trying to fudge actions he doesn't want to take?" The answer is yet to emerge. [10] 
Analysis 
The Pakistani government's decision to join the U.S.-led international coalition against terrorism had led 
to skepticism about Musharraf's ability to rein in the pro-Taliban and other Islamist factions in Pakistan. As 
events in Pakistan during the last four months have shown, the president is in control of the situation, and 
he has crucial support for his policies from a majority of the middle-class population, members of the 
media and academia, and even a large section of the moderate political establishment in Pakistan. 
Criticism against his speech from the main political parties and radical Islamists notwithstanding, the 
contemporary domestic situation in Pakistan suggests that General Musharraf can transform Pakistani 
society if he has the intent and will to redeem his promises. Right now he has the initiative and the 
momentum, but his policies will have to show quick and positive economic results, and progress in the 
fight against corruption, feudalism and Islamic radicalism, if such momentum and popular support are to 
be maintained and religious extremism is to be kept at bay. 
Indian officials' skepticism of General Musharraf's intentions and capabilities comes from a deep mistrust 
engendered by previous Pakistani leaders. Indian officials note that in 1993-94, Pakistani presidents 
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharief, after promising to end Pakistani sponsorship of terrorism, reneged 
once U.S. pressure on Pakistan was relaxed. General Musharraf himself banned the anti-Shia militant 
organization Lashka-re-Jhangvi and the anti-Sunni organization Sipah-e-Mohammad on August 14, 2001, 
but they continue to be active as ever. [11] According to Indian policymakers, his ability to effectively curb 
terrorist groups in Pakistan is questionable. Indian experts find it hard to believe that despite supposed 
full cooperation from Pakistan's military and ISI (Inter Services Intelligence), the top leadership of Al-
Qaeda continues to elude the grasp of the U.S. military. Indian officials regard the ISI as a state within a 
state that, according to them, has hindered rather than helped U.S. anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan.  
Notwithstanding India's mistrust of the Pakistani government's intentions, General Musharraf's speech 
has cajoled the Indian government into rethinking its approach to regional issues, especially Kashmir. 
There is growing pressure on the Vajpayee government from outside as well inside India to initiate 
negotiations with Pakistan and settle all pending issues including Kashmir. During recent visits to India, 
prominent world leaders such as British Prime Minister Tony Blair, Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji, 
and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell urged the Indian government to find ways of ending the present 
military stand-off with Pakistan. There is near unanimity in India for a strong posture towards Pakistan, yet 
significant sections of the Indian political establishment and academicians have suggested a conciliatory 
approach to end the current military impasse. [12] 
From an international perspective, two conflicting theories about Pakistan's existential choices are 
currently in vogue. A skeptical school of thought has it that the military-led government in Islamabad was 
faced with a Hobson's choice when it was asked to join the U.S.-led anti-terror campaign. The more 
optimistic theory flows from General Musharraf's recent policy pronouncements. In a commemorative 
speech in December 2001, he declared his intention to remodel Pakistan according to the lost vision of 
Mohammad Ali Jinnah, that country's founding father, who wanted a tolerant and moderate Pakistan 
society. It is likely General Musharraf set this goal in reaction to worldwide outrage over the terrorist 
assault on India's Parliament House and the attackers' suspected links to at least two Pakistan-based 
terrorist networks. Yet, his high-profile campaign against Islamic fundamentalist and political terrorism had 
begun earlier, during the run-up to the July 2001 India-Pakistan summit in Agra. Viewed in this 
perspective, his latest blueprint appears to underline a Pakistan-centric political resolve as distinct from a 
clever response to international dismay over recent events. 
The centerpiece of Musharraf's new political agenda is an elaborate system of regulations being applied 
to the network of religious institutions in Pakistan. The prime objective apparently is to liberate Pakistan 
from a virtual anti-culture of sectarian strife that exists within the majority of Muslim societies. However, 
the pervasive menace of terrorism, whose critical mass has been traced to the dominant extremism of 
some of these religious institutions, is also to be weeded out. If, on balance, Musharraf is looking to 
emulate his one-time role model Kemal Ataturk by facilitating a politics of tolerance, his attempt to 
dismantle Pakistan's existing system of a separate minority electorate deserves notice. As a logical 
follow-up, he should also restore democracy in Pakistan and remove the praetorian shadows. [13] 
For more topical analysis from the CCC, see our Strategic Insights section. 
For related links, see our South Asia Resources. 
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